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, page 1---E dwa rd G. Lans dale
Si.de 1, Reco rded Nove mber 29 , 1984

L:

me at my grea tly adva,nced age,
Now this, i.s earl y in the morn ing for

s1.i1 ce 1908 , that 1·s a long time .

le
But I woul d like to talk to you a litt

some ques tion s and so on,
bi.t and then shut up and let you ask

And I' thin k

es '· toda:y
Phil ippi nes that has, has sc:,me echo
T will star t with some thing in the
in the Sov iet bord ers and seve ral
in Nica ragu a and El Salv ador and over
othe r plac es in the worl d.

ther e.
And had echo es in Viet Nam when I went

st gue rilla s just afte r Worl d War II
But we had a figh t agai nst Com muni
got invo lved with the man who beca me
ther e, and I got invo lved with it,
ther e, Ramo n Mag says ay.
Secr etar y of Nati onal Defe nse over
the prob lem.

And we lick ed

lead ersh ip and thei r
The Com muni st gue rilla s had a mili tary

ander in the fiel d, thei r comb at man,
Chie f of Staf f or thei r acti ve Comm
Supr emo.
had a fanc y title ; he was call ed the

And the Huks Supr emo was a

scho ol, but had n't got much furt her.
coun try boy who had gone thro ugh high
ippi ne
forc es and then up agai nst the Phil
He had foug ht agai nst the Japa nese
help
ul when I came back ther e and try and
forc es, and was bein g very succ essf
them in 1950 .

surr ende red and was
And we defe ated him, he came in and

nt in
nt, and is part of Marc os' gove rnme
even tual ly pard oned by the gove rnme
I went
when you were out at Leav enwo rth;
the Phil ippi nes toda y. But in 1976
e
facu lty and the stud ent body out ther
out ther e to give a lect ure, and the
Taru c, had come over t o the Unit ed
were tell ing me, I just miss ed Luis
beat
incl udin g how he beat me and how- I
Stat es and he had give n a lect ure,
I
fasc inat ed me.
I'm sorr y I miss ed that ; it woul d have
him over ther e.
find out what he said .
went afte r the stud ents very hard to
have it on tape .

I wish they had tape d it.

They didn 't

But I woul d have real ly like d

i_ed
to defe at all the time and what worr
to have know n the guy I was tryin g
I did
fort h, to give me some clue s to what
him and what made him happ y and so

G. Lansd ale
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right and what I did wrong .

What I thoug ht was, h1?il liant might ha;ve been

t on.
a stupid mista ke, you know, and I had never caugh
good educa tion.

It would have been a

g and try±n g ·
But one of the stude nts there wfien I was, talkin

one thing that made you folks
to find out said that, he asked him, what was the
fail , his gueri llas.

, the
And he said, well, the Army or tfie go·veil'.'nment .

night i you never knew whe"l'.'e
Army starte d makin g it very diffi cult f0r us, at
they were.

They would keep comin g after us all the time.

g0t worn out and had to give up.

S-0 we final ly· jus•t

Well, my own .. ,I don 1't think he thoug ht

him.
deepl y enoug h about why or how we had defea ted

But I thoug ht mys-e lf

these peopl e, who were
in the thing that we took the revol ution away from
tryin g to have a revol ution .

They were fighti ng what they calle d a. peopl es'.'t

war, and we took the peopl e away from them,
in stopp ing them.

And we were very succe ss,ful

lla.
Today , oddly enoug h, there is a new- Comm unist gueri

es:t Army, and · someo :l,' tfie;i.);'
force in the Phil;i .ppine s, they call the New Peopl
unive rsity, the Uni've!t:'s·i::ty ,
leade rs:, they are mostl y city boys from the state
of the Philip pines , and they are much like you:

they nave gone up into tfie

st Marco s and push
hills to fight again st the gover nment and again
of their own,

a. progra m

young s.t ers
But the only thing that makes me hopef ul , all these

Huks were and they are doing
feel that they are ten times, as smart as the old
gover nmen t's side remem bers)
the same thing s, and I ... I hope someb ody on the
come back to them and maybe
what, .. what we did in the old days and it will
it will do it.

ing the way-,
So far the Philip pine Army, unfor tunat ely, ;i:.s· behav

we did in Viet Nam, and that' s wrong .

You don't run gueri lla wars out there ,

s· in Salva dor and other- place s·,
They are behav ing the way we are teach ing other
Nicar aguan s: who are in
r-tm afraid we're givin g the wrong advic e to the
the 5andi nistas .
0ppos·ition to the Contr as there (.illeg ible) to

,,

We don it
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understand revolution, and yet we are a country th.at was bern in a

rev0lution,

So we all are antecedents of revolutionarie.s·, and if we w0uld

ever s·top and th.ink a little bit about where we come from and what we know·
ins·tinctively in our veins and in the family and so forth and going back in
history and reading a little bit, why it would start coming clearer on wnat
could be the strength that we could make use of.
back in 1950 after

r

In the Philippines-, I came

had been there ... I left there in t4g and was asked back

by the President of the Philippines to help their intelligence, the Philippine
military intelligence get good against the Huks,

I discovered.,.principa,l ly,

he had asked for help because he never knew when they were going to a,tta,ck
where
the palace/ he was staying, and he would have armoured cars· up ••• outsi:de of ·
his· bedroom to protect him and beat off enemy attacks,
far, but he was afraid of that.

They- never got that

And maybe Taruc was thinking, you know·.;.

he was in the. same position up in the mountains when the Army ca,me a,gai.ns·t
him .

But the military were misbehaving.

The main purpose, · they tfiemght,

c,f the guy with a gun was to go out and shoot people.

Now

people meant · Uie:·

enemy and anybody standing next to the enemy and anybody tha_t wa.s .in the
neighborhood and that meant villagers and the people in the,.,a,nd tfie. :Huks
were foll0wing Mao's dictum of getting close to the people and d<Dinq political
work, getting the people to support them, and when the troops would go out and
misbehave a,r0und villagers, the Communist guerillas· would sa,y, s:ee, thqt 1·s·
•• , they aren t t y0ur friends; they are enemies· of all of us·, a,nd we• 11 help

,,

you; the only way to get ahead in this· world is t© join us· and pi:cR:-up a rifle ~·
too, and we'll kill the. enemy.

And I talked to people cominq in by nus ;f;rcmr:i

the prov.t.nce.s into a place like Mani le\.
manned hy troops: a.long the hi_ghway.

They s·a,id there would be checkpoints·

And r remember the da,ughte.;l'.' o;f; the. Col6nel ·
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who was, the G-2 of the Philippine Armv, was telling me ,. , she, said,

she wa.s crying, she s-aid, these troops got all the passengers off a,nd

cm

s,tarted checking them, and they beat up on two ki.d s tha.t were
with her, friends of hers·, and she said , it's terrible ,
did they do?

the bus

And I S'il.i.d, wnat

She said, well, they di.dn I t move fas·t enou<?Jh,

The tr00ps·

wanted them off the bus· fast t0 be searched and they jus:t we.ren ''t mQ-ving
fast enou gh.

So this was. a military that e s s entially· saw themselves a.s

hein('f apart f ~ ·the people.

Well, one of the things· that we d±d was· to

move tne troops in closer t0 the people.

We sta.rted with dis:eipl.;r:ne, · hut

also when .. . in getting them to act in ways to help the. pe0ple.,
something called Civic Action, which is part of the
military operations now.
Philippines .

u~s.

we

Army i:i,nd

started

u.s ~

That was really a device· that we, used in the

I invented the name, •• I had to teach what tci do a,nd they

said, what do you call it?

So I started thinking a name up witk tliat na;me

as an activity, that the troops would do.

And it's a.mazing now· to see it

in all the U.S. forces which this was meant originally for the PfliJippine
fo'l'.'ces.

But we also extended that a great deal and got the Army in helping

the farmers go to Peoples' Court to fight land claims.

In the, past, tena,nt

farmers had had a lot 0f tremble going up against landlo~ds, who would cmme
to these Courts with their lawyers and outtalk the poor farme'.l'..' 1 who would
s:ta,nd there with their hat i .n their hand trying to get some justice for his•
claims, and never ·understand what the lawyers were arguing about , jus-t get
beaten down hy it.

So our Judge Advocate in the Philippine Army got his

Judge Advoccite lawyers to go to these Peoples' Courts and be the free. ccmnsel
of farmers· cases·.

And we started changing the outlook of the government towards

the pe0ple, so much_ so that eventually we got i .n to running decent elections,
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That was another thing that a recruiting drive on the Communist s-ide

was· that the government cheated in the last election and hadn~t.,.had roh5ed
the people of their vote.

So the Communists· had a slogan of ooycotting

elections, that you couldn •·t win an election and that y0u didn ~t get your
'ffian to win.

And I remember going up country and seeing a friend of mine

who was in the last election , and I said, is it true that they are cfieatingf
And hes-aid, well, I'll put it this way, he said , they either robbed me
of my vote last time or my poor old mother; he said, I was running for as-eat
and we both voted, but they only gave me one vote.
vote for myself, I did that, but
·m0ther would vote for me, too.
he cheated, see.

r•m

And he. sa,:;i:.d, l: know· l;~d

sure my old, my pe0r old gray-haired

They wouldn • t give her a v(;)te, :so I: guess·

But this is the feeling in the, . , throughQut · the Philippines~\

So we used the Army to backstop the Commis:si0n on Elections and ·make sure
that there was a decent , honest election .
electicm.

And that was in 1951 in the bye

And the President of the Philippines, Quirino, was i .n Sp9,in

visiting when we did that and came back just the day before elections·, and
he. trim to change everything .

I was in the Chief of Staff 1' s office and he

got some direct order • . . he stood at attention at his· desk there and sa):d,
yes , sir, no sir, and I knew either God was talking to him.or the. Pres-ident
and the President was trying to get him to move troops out of some precincts·
in critical districts, and he didn't do it .

And he said, no sir, the Commiss-±on

on Elections asked me to do that and I ' m going to go ahead and do that, and
itts legal and it's the right thing for the Army to do.

And so when he hung

up , he said, that was .. ,I said, I know, congratulations; I shook his· hand,

r

said you did the right thing.

He said, can I get a job tomorrow-.

P:r;es.-:j;dent will probably kick me out as Chief of Sta,f'f.

The

And J: said, yeah.,
d

y-o.u Hl ha;ve a jQ>h, and you tll have a place in tnis, country,. .

,f

Well , an amazing

Side 1, Recorded November 29, 1984 , page 6- .,...,- Edward G. Lansdale

L:

thing happened:

the opposition won.

The c:andia-a:t:e·s -won in all the

places-, so it obviously wasn ' t the government cheating of tfie administrati~n,
the in 1's cheating, but the eiut '' s had gotten a chance and a decent .•• the people
gave the credit to the Army of giving their government back to them again ,
and it suddenly became a geivernment of the p e ople, by the people, for the
people again.

And the Communists were trying t(1) get the peop le to go agaj::n~:t
'l

the government, and the Army and the people said , that ''s - our g0vernment , you
know, and we 're not going to do it (illegible phrase}.

But the funnies-t

thing that happened, I went up right after election day, the next day , up
H

into the •.. where the Huk country is, was the mo~-t figh:tj:ng in Cent;l'.'a,l Luzon ;
·up em P0mpanga at this· point, and when a convoy was stopped with. troops-~
they would get down to relieve themselves- from the trucks, and so.me 0:f; them
would still be up there manning machine guns and so forth., keeping an eye out
as guard for the train on the · thing, and the men would stand over to the side
of the road and upzip their pants and so forth as the usual type of thing,
and this was near a village.

And I saw this convoy stopped and the men hop

off, and the villagers saw them and all of a sudden the troops, wer e the her oes-;
they didntt know it at that time .

And these guys were all standing there and

then they got embarassed; all the girls and the wc,men from the village came
running cmt and hugged them and kissed them and so forth and they were jiggling
arcmnd like this .... and I got .... we've got it made from here on , it '' s clear
sailing.

We've g0t a victory in the making.

And this sort of thing is- wha,t l'

wished TaTuc w0uld have e .x plained, because we turned tnem from

t

51 , that

electicm , we turned around, the Huks ha,d to leave off all their usual haunts
and they., , we drove them back into remote a,reas- up in tne. mounta,ins- and went
a fter them ther- e, qnd j ust kept on going ,
s~eeping at nights fo r them and s o on.

And that's' when it beca,me h a.rd ,

But the real victor y took place in a
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way that was.n it -military at all.

There were three or four Filipinos·

wfi0 were working clcsely together in there, and they came over to Viet Nam

later when I went over there and were helping me there and trying to help
the Vietnames e Army do this· thing, but the Vietnames e 'A

y had been trained

by the French and, • . in a modern, western Army way 0f fight..tng guerillas·, and

I don 1·t think that they ever learned how to fight the guerillas· that tney

were up against,

They tried very hard; some of them knew, a few 0f them,

and some of the Americans knew over there and they had gotten experienc e, hut
it used to break our heart everyday to see what would happen and the -mistakes·
made and the things going wrong.

But I was very fortunate in being included

into a spot where I had to learn, and fortunate ly there wa.sntt a lot of attention
being put on it so there wasntt a journalis t with space in American pape'l:'s
looking over my shoulder all the time, and to say, 0h, dcm't d0 tnat 0;1; ·w:r1a,t
a stupid move that is and so forth.

So we could make -mistakes, anddci lSette(l:1

next time and so forth and teach ourselves what ~s- happening .
of the few wins our side ever had.

And it '-s· cme

The British. and Malayans won

out B:r;i.;tti::sn

and Malaya used to come over to see the great things that we were doing, and ·
it surprised me that the little things we used to do in Viet Nam w0uld be
all over Asia and down in Malaya where the British were fighting and China
and Japan would start getting inquiries about it.

The war was· goi::ng on in

Korea and, thank God, that kept all the military brass and everythin g locking
at Korea and not at what we were doing.

And it also made them deny us equip~

ment, and the Philippin e Army would have a Christmas catalog sort of, of U.S\
equipment to ask for; the Navy would always ask for a submarine , you know,
you need a submarine against guerilla forces up
that's great stuff,

in the mounta,.:j:ns ·, you know·,

We would have to say no and we ha,d to d()) it on the. cneek

and on our own and with. our own wits, much as· the wa,y that the guerillas did,
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And it worked.

we had, going down to fundamentals· and principles that

~ eally werked. Well, listen, l was just going to talk for a moment s0 . ., when
I sta'l'.'t, I' can 1· t s·top.

So r' 11 stop for a minute and see if you have got

questions and so forth that I can answer.
Q:

Yeah?

When you were talking, you said that we made mis:takesO
, you · Rn~w~ in

dea,Hng with ..•
L:

Please list them .• ,I'rn not going to.

Q:

Well, what could we have done right, not list them, but what were some'

of the things that .. ..
L:

Oh, I see, I see.

Well, let me tell you one thing tfia,t ... we ane . a,

technical nation, and we love our equipment.

When you are commandtng men

and particularly in the Army and in the Infantry, you ty;y t0 use your equip~
ment to cut down your losses, you are commanding, and you a,'l'.'ever;y 9,pt to us~ ·
your high power weapons, artillery, and keep the enemy at a distance and
punish them.

So one of the things is, you get in where. you start •. , letts?

say you are going along a road and you start getting to some weapons''
on your convoy or your troops walking along the r0ad.

fire

The commander's f irs:t

thought is to get some weapons against that fire right away and if he has
artillery, he's going to use it.

Now, we used to do that in Viet Nam , use

artillery, and then finally we got to :really harassing fire against locati'0ns,
and not knowing the targets, but just picking places and firing at will,
enemy would go and ... he had a form of psychological judo.

The

He would g0 into

a village and teach the people how to make slit trendies under thei;i:? beds·
or next to their shacks and so for;th., and teach. them that we were their
enemies.

We'd be walking along the road, the Americans· and the ,Vietnwnese

Army were going to try· to kill thes·e people,

So when that happens-, get down
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in these slit trenches and get ycmr children there and try, and sta,y· sa,-1:e

until the firing is over.

With that, they would wait until the troops wer e
Well trie

going along the road nearby the village and open fire on them.

villagers couldn't go out and say, gee, these are five guys that came in last
night; they don• t belong here and so forth.; they aren • t part 0f us·,

A,nd tliey

couldn ~t s-top them, b.ut here on the road ins.tead of going and sending troc;,ps,
in to find out what was really going on, y0u open up with artillery·, and wliat
you 1'-ve done, you I ve made a whole bunch of pe0ple, hundreds, of people hate
ycm and be afraid of you, that you are the enemy.

You try and kill innocent

people, including children, by staying at a distance and firing,

r remember

a very fine U.S. Army officer I first met down in Indonesia, and lie was· an
Attache there, an Army Attache, but he was very close to some of the I:ndqne::;i;a,n ·
Army leaders, and I thought, gee, what an unusual guy he was,

He went int©

one of the General' s houses and the General• s kids· saw· him I and here wa,s·

a

bi_g,

tall American, they were climbing up him like he was a hill o'l'.' sometliing 1
when he came to the door and hugging and everything.
in this· house.

He was really· welcome ·

And he introduced me to most of the top brass· in the rndonesi.an

Army and r got a lot accomplished in a couple of hours, more than 'I!lany· days· of
work otherwise, just because of his introductions.

But he came up t()) Viet Nam

and was given a command, given one star in Viet Nam, and commanded a brigade
that was just outside of Saigon.

And during the Tet offensive he went in and

covered one district that my team and I had worked with the people livtng tn
the dist'l'.'ict to take them away from politically supporting the other s±de and
coming over to our side.

And it was a poor, working clas·s neighborhood,

Well ",

some of the enemy had gotten into thie neighborhood, District 8 0f saigQn ·ana
so on, and he was· sent in to clean up the enemy·, District B, · a few: o;f them were

''
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The people in District 8, he didn ' t know that they- were very- loyal t0 our

s-ide, came up and tried to explain to the Americans that there a r e a f ew- of . the
enemy in here; we will show· you where they are.,.and they told it .• ,t0ld him. and
his· men that .

And he didn't believe them.

He said that was a sc'l':'awny l0oking

place and everything, so he brought in artillery and blasted all these houses
down.

Well, we had spent two years teaching these people , you can have a

start in life.

we gave them some places out in the mud flats· outs-±.d e of · town

along the river.

And we taught them how to dry mud ny (illigible)it up and

letting it dry out in the sun and building foundations·, and building thei r
own shacks there.

So whether the shacks looked awful or not, they were a ll

these people had and they were proud that they had gotten a little ahead where
they were.

And then we started a lot of self- ... cottage indus·tries in tfiere

and let them start earning some money on their own.
pride.

They were getting som.e

And when the enemy had come in before that, a lot of them were relatives

or sons or friends of theirs; these people used to yell at them to quit; you•re
en the wrong side, come on over and be with us, come home.

And the enemy was·

afraid to let the troops ever to come close, except during the Tet offens-ive
they· were supposed to take the city of Saigon, and they came in to do it.

And

there were just a couple of them who were strangers really to these people,
were in the hous·e , and the American artillery destroyed all these houses .

Well 1

during the fighting, I sent my team down there to see what help we c ~uld get ,
and the people told my folks who had worked with them very closely, t0 never
show up again.

They hated Americans, all Americans , from then ·o n.

And -my

team came back and they were trying to report to me, and they wer e c r ying,
These were grown men, you know, and they'd worked two years getting these
people to the place .,. a.nd I went down to a meeting f r om that and wes~mo;reland

G. Lansda ,le
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y team meetin g, and
was, in it, it was an Ambas sadors ' meetin g, a countr

enemy out, •. , and you 1·ve
Westie was: tellin g how his forces were pushin g the
to speak -up fat!'.? the
loused up one distri ct, you know, and I'm just going
people there.

You are doing it wrong.

And Ambas sador Bunker said, I' don 1·t

know wheth er you ought to speak right now.

Lookin g at your pictur e, so damn

g a.t him.
mad, you know, you are red in the face and youtre yellin
want to yell at somebo dy in this meetin g?
of my system .

So I did.

You ' really

I said, yeah-, · I got to get it out ·

And later on I saw this: Bi!;iga deer who · wa,s, cornma.nd:i::,n9

there, whom I had known down in Indon esia.

I was up on the· Hill tes•t.i'•f'.ying

for the Senate and he was in for the same hearin g.

And I came i _n and Fie

d talkin g, a,nd he
was talkin g with senato rs and saw me, and he just stoppe
kick in the pants, fox., ',meet
leaned over, and he said, yeah, I owe y0u cme geod
He sald, I did the wrong thing there in Dist't' ict 8,

And he sa,.id, I' he·iu::,d

fiOW,'

for doing- the · W'J'.iGng thing ,
-madr you got at Gener al Westm oreland and all the Army
I said, no, I can't do i t in front · of the

He said, go ahead and kick me.
Senate , ycm know, like this.

And then the Senato r said, what is all tfiis~ • .

lves?
what sort of jokes do you milita ry men have among yourse

I said, well,

we got involv ed in
this is a very person al war for some of us, ycm know,
I hope I' answer ed the questi on.

±t.

I had my ... way around the hill on the thing.

Yeah ?

Q:

in 1961?
Can you tell me what happen ed to the Taylor report

L:

Uh, I don't know.

I went over it with Taylor and when I came back, Taylor

y.
wanted us to all go in and talk with Presid ent Kenned

He said that pr,esid ent

Kenned y wanted •...
SIDE 2

this meetin g in the Oval
Well, ·my daugh ters· at home will want to hear about
was going back and forth.
O:ff i _ce, so he promp tly g t in the rockin g chair and
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And Pres·ident Kennedy came in and he tried to get out of his· r0cking

chair and it caught him in the hips and he was bringing the wfiele chair up ,
s0 he flad to pull the chair loose and let the Pres·ident come in and sit down,
But , he asked us to finish up the report, and there were reconnnendations- that
·R ostow and Taylor were going to work on further, and so were the rest of us.
Rut Kennedy asked me to get apart from the others and wait, that he wanted
to say something to me.

So what it was, he wanted '.Ille to go to work on some

Cuban problems: and had nothing to do with Viet Nam.
got mixed up in those Cuban things.

And I ~m sor'l'.'y I : ever

I've been highly critical about the Bay

of Pigs and the way the U.S. had gone about things, and I tried to introduce
some revolutiemary tactics· there, but the U.S. had in mind command0 raids·
for Cuba and had never gotten it out of their heads that that wa,s· the way, to
fight a revolution, was through a commando raid,
that,

I couldn~t disabuse them of

But they had forgotten the American Revolution and how revoluti'Qns•

are fought psychologically and with political input.

So I wasn 1· t very succes.ful.

Yeah?
~-:·

Who was it that usually ... like in the Cubans ... who was it wanted the

commando raids?
L:

Was it the military or was it the .. .

No, the military was by and large critical of the raid there at the Bay

of Pigs, and yet the Joint Chiefs had been in on it, and one section of the
J0int Chiefs,.,and afterward in the review, they were trying to determine
what happened.

And they were sure that somebody in that b ui1cil.ii.gg, and they

would look:. at me as· if, somebody you know, and I said, my friends, I got out
of the country when this thing was formed for a reason.

I knew that the thing

was going to fail, you were going to turn around, you were the guys with egg
on your face and you were going to wipe it off and say somebody else has egg
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I

got tne. hell out of here, I went to Viet Nam.

1·60,

And I wrote a report and

I

tn

early •61 when the whole thing was planned, and .insisted on bringing in

the Joint Staff and the Joint Staff section to be the military· input~n the
thing.

to

And they didn•t catch on themselves that they didntt have en0ugh

run a, a, really an amphibious operation.
ambitious for CIA to do.

It was too little,

I:t was- t00

Now there were s0me military· men in CTA whose idea,

it was, but none of them were experienced in amphibian 0perations·, and initia,lly
there was a thought of doing what Castro had done, was· go up in the hills
and get s0me of the people , including those that had been with Castro, to
fight the Castro government.

And that I went with.

And as soem · as they s-ta1::ted

talking an across the beach operation and holding ground as they hit the.
beaches and so forth, I said, you can't do that in a ceuntry· where the. Army·
and everything is as alert as they are there, and we are going to get clobDe;i:;ed,
And they got me out of those meetings.
This· is· a policy meeting.

They said, please don I t talk that way·.

I said, well, in policy meetings· yon have got to

get very honest, and you should have talk.
allowed; you can't talk very plainly.
give you a comment right now.

And incidentally, that isn 1-t

I'll change the subject a little ~nd

And please don't ever quote me em tliis.

I thought it a very strange thing .•. I was an Assistant to the Secretary
Defense, and appointed, and the only military man who was·,

But

of

And used ten

watch. the Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Chiefs talk in the Pentagon and t~
each other, and then see them up before the President.

And when Viet Nam was,

developing and everything, they would talk very big in the :Pentag<m and tfien
usually the Chairman would go up and talk with the President and sem1e of · the
National Security Council people or in Cabinet meetings, and usually when he
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got up there, the President would say something and the Chie£ cf Staff

. he wanted a n0.
would say·, yes:, sir, or n0, sir, 1.f
and c0rrect.

~ po 1·;tte
And h e was, ,very·

And then he would go back and he would rep0rt t0 the . other

Chiefs, this is what the President wants, he wants us· to do.

And they said, well

Chief didn't you tell him this, that we had discussed before a.nd everything.
I did hut this is his decision he made.

Well, he didn '' t ever say. , , you know)

well, we considered this and here's some things t0 think of.

And it used t~

get the:rn because when I'd be present at some of these meetings and tlie
President would ask me and I'd tell him point blank,

And they·1'd c0me to me

in great shock; you said no to the President; you said that c0uldn•t be done
and so forth.

I said, this is what any citizen has to do when he gets- up to

the top guy, he needs ... he's not an expert on this., he figures that I: am 0r
at least have some knowledge of it, and this is the time to be honest, before
people go cmt and get killed and so forth trying t0 do the right thing for the
United States.

And I never understood ... some of those people, when

r

taJk that

way, guys would think I'm a hot air artist and everything, but I did things·
like that that shocked them apparently.

And they were trying to explain away

·my attitudes and so forth, that weren't normal.

But I hope and t'l;ust that

when you get, later in life when you get up to positions where you are called
in by the top brass and so forth, whether it's civilian or military, that you
will be honest yourself .

You have yourself

live with all those other peop le,

to live with and you don 1·t have to

But your own inside feelings and everything

are the. thing that you have to live with easily, and I urge that you tell the
tlmth, too, at that time.
Q:

Well, got another question?

Why didn I t you have the same control over the Viet Nam si.t uatiQn as·. , .

Philippines ... (illegible)
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I did 0riginally.

I was ... and not quite as much but almost~ that 1's · a

good question, inc identally.

It I s one that gives me nightn),tr es- once in awhile,

and I' wake up and worry about it.
Viet Nam.

Initially the 'French were pulling out 0f ·

They had been defeated at Dien Bien Phu

and had accepted defeat

at Geneva, and we finally got a French--A:rnerican military 1nission put together
in Viet Nam, working with the Vietnamese Army; it was called FRIEND.
had the pacification division of that group:
pacification divisions.

And I'

Army, Navy, Air Force in

And each of the divisions had a chief officer of

one nation and an executive of the other nation, so I was Chief of the
pacification division.

I had a French Colonel as my Executive, and then

our staff was in both nations.

But we, we got the Vietnamese Army- to star t

behaving themselves and doing very, very well, and I thought that they were
really learning how to do it.

/

They were very reluctant to do such . things> as

civic action to behave themselves, to even driv e the roads· carefully-.
gave ... we had contests, driving contests for the Vietnamese Army ,

We

I remember

before one of our operations we had a big ceremony and awarded the.,.gave
se>me awards to the best drivers.

And they met in the town plaza and the.

military band was there and played and the troops came up and g0t thei);
decerations, got back into their trucks.

And a great mob of the locals·,

villagers, had gotten there, and they took off, right through. these mobs·,
and kids were yelling, the women were grabbing chicks· and everything up out
ef the way, and they broke all the rules ef safe driving with the new· medals•,
I Am The Best Driver In The Outfit, on and going right through ,,, and so tlie
lessons I don~t think were ever really learned but. ,, it was· great fun -g etting
a medal, but when they got them, went right on •.. , .. but , .. and in se:,me of: 0ur
n.ig pacification opercttions the behavior of the t r oops· changed and they,,, they·
lear ned themsekves what.,,one of them was up in central Viet Nam , the lctst
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big one, and they ... the ... under the Geneva Accords: the enemy was with-

drawing to the rnz,rth_ through a port of embarkation, while we wel'.:e try±ng to
take over the area that they were getting ou.t of,

And the troQlp commandeJ'."

believed very much in what we were trying to do and he, insisting on the
troops ooeying • •. and so initially they were doing it under the orders, under
the duress, of their officers forcing them to .... get int<:> it and ask t 0 rebuild
a market place or the public buildings were down and so forth or a bridge
would be broken and they'd, put temporary repair.

And the enemy in retreating

were telling the people about the Vietnamese Army and describing them; they
came in and ate little children for breakfast and so forth; terrible pe0ple
and watch out for them, they rape all the girls , and so trying to get them
very much against the , Army.

But the word of what the Army was doing and how.-

it was behaving and trying to help the people got out ahead of the l\rmy, and bythe second day of the operation, the people in these towns were coming out and
greeting

the Vietnamese Army.

After the ... then it was the Viet Minh

for the Communist forces left to go down to their port of embarkatio n and our side came along , the people were out bringing water to the troops, throwing
flowers for them; they were heroes to the people.

And these guys liked playing

the her o, you know, so about the second and third day they were all say ing ,
hey, that building over there needs some help, you know, and asking their
captain's permission or their lieutenant to go over and work on things and
everything.

And by the .•. it took roughly ten days to the port of embarkation,

and the .. ,by the time the Communists got down there to go aboard Polish liberty
ships,, which_were U.S. made and they had never been painted and everything bythe Communists p,nd were rus:ty old hulks there, to go nor th.

But the Communist
l

tro0ps going aboard were trying to kidnap the younger people,, the, 12 years, o ld ,
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13 and 14 year olds, to go north and be trained by them to be infiltrators·

later back down south.
tfiem.

And the people were throwing rocks at them and hated

And they said, get out of here.

And the, • . they we!t'e tupnin9" a,!l'.louna and

bucking the Philippine Army coming in because they behaved so well ,
their propoganda and everything just failed them.
with the forces

And all

And I remembe•F I baa a wan

down ... I sent one adviser in, a First Lt ,

1

were

roughly two divisions, troops in an operation, and he stayed withtheComri)an aer
and he and the Commander were close friends and everyoody t00k that very amiss:,
I remember General O'Daniel saying, do you think that's; enough?

And J' sa±.a ,

the Commander, the Vietnamese Commander, listens to them~ the¥ are close
friends-, they are sharing a tent together on this march .

Ana I saia , you

don't need more than one guy get in the place and that's go0d enough , · And ·
r •m in touch with him by radio everyday all along, time of the day·,

But he

let me know about the people throwing rocks at the C0mmunist troops·.

Sc :t

went up to see Ngo Dinh Diem, who was the Chief of State at
said, why don't you go on up there
out.

(illigible)

that time , and I

was wher e they were going

I said, you go up there and after the Communists leav e, just reestablish_ ·

your government up there.

And he said, well, should T.?

have turned the people against us.

I hear the Communists·

I said, no, just the reverse is happening ,

Theyare thr0wing rocks at them, the Communist troops leaving.

And the French.

were v ery critical of Diem and very critical of me and so forth,

Bu.t I' talked

them into getting some of their top French military brass and some of the Paris
mass correspondents and some of the other correspondents from metropolitan
F:t'ance to go up there and witness it.

And Diem wanted me t {';l go.

we s-houldntt have a lot of ,Americans ar0und this,

I: said , no,

It is· up to you a nd let the

'.F':r;ench witness ·Vietnamese running Vietnamese affairs-,

So he went up ther e I a.nd
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I have pictures at home of this:

the Vietnamese crowded around this-

Ngo Dinh Diem,_ wh0m we had said was a remote, mandarin type of a guy, a little
roly-p<"ly guy, and they lifted him up on their sh0ulders and were c a,r'l7ying him
around, and I can see ..• this picture, all these people and men and w@men the~e
and the mob are cheering this guy and with great big happy smiles- on thei.r
faces as- they are doing it.

And the French came back.

This French. General

saw him and he said, I am one of the guys that used t0 say- they made a terrible
mistake ever putting Diem in to run this country, but he said going up and seeing
this·, he said, I wouldn't have believed it unless I'd seen it with my

0wn

eyes,,

And later on when the Americans started talking so against Diem, I 1'd sn0w- them
this- picture:

do you recognize him?

r 1·d say, yea,h.,,

They'd say, that's- Diem,

these are the people you say hate him and everything; look at their faces and
you can just see on this,

And we'd never handled it correctly,. ,

C:

Let•s take a ten minute break.

Q:

... and also, why does the U.S. continue to buy oil (illegible} , ,,

L:

Ah, boy, that's a double edged question.

Q:

r

L:

Yeah.

know what my opinion is.

Would you like to answer · it?

I want to hear what yours is,

Uh, I don't know how large a net he has- of terrorists·, out · I' douo.t

that it ts that organized, and maybe he himself would 1·t know,
he is the type who funds such things.

I know. that he,

He's got a tremendous ego and gets

enthusiasm for doing this, and a person like that isn't always- keeping track oi;
his (?)wn actions and so forth , which I suspect, he isn't.
voices, give approval, whether these terrorists

He's listening to

(J:lligiblel

say, yes-,

b0s-s, r-•11 go do it, or the aides around him saying, that ts a smart ·m0v e tha.t
you just made and so forth.

That's what he's paying attention to really, and

s-a lving his own ego on the thing.

Why we do business ,. I don i t know,

We shoot

ale
Side 2, ReCE)'.J?ded N0vem her 29, 1984, page 19~--E dwa,rd G. Lansd

L:

do busine ss
dewn his aircra ft and say, you 're a good busine ss-man , we

with ... I don't know what the ration ale is for such a thing,
s-imple r tnan the one we live in.

I like rules simple r,

I like a world

If you are again st

him, or at le~st
somebo dy and want them to stop, why not be an enemy and stop
thing strong ly en0ugl i. ·
get him out of doing wrong and so forth and believ e in a
to do so.
Q:

Yeah?

I can't really answer you.

d.
I wonde r if you could go over how this Phoeni x progra m evalve

In

your opinio n (.illeg ible) ..• succes sful?
L:

Yeah .

The Phoen ix progra m was essen tially Bill Colby 's

and Bill Colny-

later came back ·
was the CIA Statio n Chief in Viet Nam for quite a time, and
And it was later on that the Phoeni x

in pacifi cation and took it up again.

again.
progra m was really , was most effect ive when he came back

Rut hi:;,,

of the 'Vietn ~ese
though t was· that he was lookin g at the politi cal struct ure
r that~
Comm unists, and he was quite correc t in wantin g to counte

And he, wa,s"

to go out and
trying to set up a progra m to encour age the Vietna mese people
is· out i _n the
get after the politi cal leader ship s:m the other side, which
Vietna mese milita,'.l;'y·
villag es· very hard for police or govern ment offici als or
to ever catch on who these guys were.
t0 them.

Cillig ible)

~

They looked just like the other citize ns-

p.ut a p't':t_ce. on tlie fiec1,d Q:f; the ,, of · tfie:se ·

people and encour aged people to start weedin g them out.
after just killin g off all the other people .

New, he wasn '·t out

He has been highly critic ized

turn the Vietna mese
fer his Phoen ix progra m, for trying to set up a progra m to
agains t each other and just kill off a lot of people .

And the critic s say,

other in the v illage s
he was gettin g people that had grudge s again st the , each.
didn~ t like, in
t0 give them a licens e to go out and kill somebo dy that they
a pe't'so nal, feud· type of thing.

It wasn tt that,

It was·,,, ended up with --m0st

the people s war i _n
of the P'?litka_l cadre who kept the enemy really going in
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Stmth Viet Nam, getting shot.

There was some cadre with the troops-, wno

were political cadre, but they were responsible to the Politbur<':) in Han(')i and
were part 0f the military chain 0f command, were di f fe'l'.'ent from the · politi:ca,l
cadre in the villages.
Phoenix program.
Vietnamese enough.

And it was a ... he was· fighting a real war in the

My feel on the thing was that it was toa> A;merica.ne

l :t Wt1;sn 't

The Vietnamese have a distrust of foreigners, very violent ·

in the French days·, but the Communists were fighting the French, but most 0:t"
the pe0ple were against the French themselves.
'Frenchman out in Viet Nam.

So it was- very lemelyt0 l:'iea

The Americans came in, we were round eyes·, we

looked differently from the people.

They didn't trust us, nor did they, t,rus-t

officials from a distant city, out in the villages.
that was at work.

It was a fear of foreigners

And when we put in programs, which we did "Ill.any- 0f · our pro-.,:-.'

grams were made by Americans and sold to the Vietnamese t0 do, nut with. Ameri:ca,nssupervising or advising and furnishing the funds and so forth, keepin9them
going,

And Phoenix was one of those.

So when the Americans left ,, the p.r ogram ·

ended,

And the Americans that ran that never understood that all the good that

they did was good up until they took a plane to go home again: boom, it ended
like that.

And when we got out of Viet Nam, our forces and our people, support

groups and everything, many of the programs that we were pushing just either
stopped or weren't done correctly or the Vietnamese lost interest and didn't
do it; they worked their own; these were the things that the Americanswanted
and they weren 1·t being d0ne for the Vietnamese own good,

They didn ~t .•. they

do now, after the defeat there in Viet Nam, some of them are taking a look back
t0 see what happened.

And sl':}me €lf them who are friends· of mine come in and say,

gee, what happened, I didn't know you guys were as confused as we were, you know.
W'e went heme as vict~r~ and left you there to get a licking, and those are hard

/
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words for them to take, but it's the truth.

And we ought to be ashamed

of oursel,ves· for what we did to them, but of; course we can '·t really· be b.ecaus:e
too on this thing,

the Americans at home were afflicted
were splitting

as· a na,tion

because we didntt understand the nature of the conflict tha,t
.

we were in.

az we

'

Ii

I think cmr government made a ,mistake in not · tea,chi'pg · a. li·ttle 1 ·
IH

,

i

explain to the people why we were there and what we were t rying · to d0 , ' a,n0 · we ·
\\

·may be doing less than we ever did.

I wish we 1 d done · later what I used to do

we~d have a pr0blem, I'd send an adviser to be with the Vietnamese and do it
and say, let them do it, and if they make ·mistakes-, they- might lea,it['n by- it,
and get close enough
about it.

to them so they'll admit their mistakes· ana. •we i::an •ta,lk

And we used to do that, but instead the military would ha;ve a,dv±sers>

at all levels, so many advisers- that all the orders· given would have to be ·
tra.nslated into Vietnamese and everything, and they were American orders,

And

now· do y0u expect men to go out and f /4ht and die fo r a bunch. of · fo't'eigneI;S·
in their own country against their own people.

They kneW-:we were sort ot · right

on the things that we said and they wanted to do the right things·, nut we were
foreigners and in a country where foreigners are those dirty guy~- tha,t ygu neve;J;'
listen to, very strange.

And I used to invite some of the Americans around ,my·

house and have parties there.

And they would come a,nd they·'d. s~y·, thi.s is, the

enly place you can sit down and really talk to Vietnamese as- people, · in my fiou~:e ,
And yet, they were advisers to the Vietnamese, they· talked to them all the ti'tne ,
And the Vietnamese families would come in and I 1'd say·, why- don it you b:12.:j:ng · your,
wives· and your .daughters· other places.
homes.
tine,

I dontt see them around tlie other American

And they said, do y~u see the way they are looking a,t our wornenall the
And, well, I didntt .. ,I didn 1 t see that nut evidently· wet,re very- lecherous·

gr0up of men, far from home, you know.-, and qur @wn we:menkina, in a foreign
p<;:!pula.th:,n to w~rk with them, and I guess there was a lot · eif ,misbehq;vi~,r ~

But
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many times- the leadership for the other side came to my house and admit

they didn "t have the answer for something and wanted to lo0k for it, and theywouldn't do that with the other Americans.

And it was good because t could

say-, well, we make mistakes like that too and this is- the way we did it once
when we made a mis-take and we discovered this-. , • • , .

